Reading what a data broker script would make of you…
Every website you open is handed most of what you see below, automatically, the moment the page loads. You did not agree to it. No prompt, no banner, no "we value your privacy" box to close. It just happens, the way a room knows when someone walks in. On their own these details are dull: your screen is a certain width, your machine has a certain number of cores, your clock is set to a certain time zone, and nobody cares about any one of them. Put together, they are a fingerprint, and not as a figure of speech. It is a combination specific enough to pick your browser out of hundreds of millions, and to keep recognising it on the next site you open, and the one after that, with no cookie, no account, and nothing you are able to clear.
This is not a corner case that worries security researchers. It is how a large slice of the web pays its bills. Ad networks use it to follow you around; data brokers collect those trails, join them together, and sell the result to advertisers, insurers, political campaigns, and roughly anyone with a form of payment; some shops use it to quietly show you a higher price. A good deal of what is sold as "anonymous analytics" is exactly this, in a nicer outfit. And the habits most people trust do very little to stop it: clearing your cookies changes nothing, because no cookie is involved; a private window forgets your history, not your fingerprint; a VPN swaps your IP address and your apparent city, which is worth doing, and leaves the other forty-odd signals exactly where they were. There is even an irritating twist, where piling on privacy add-ons and flipping every switch tends to make you easier to identify rather than harder, because now you are the one person online with that precise unusual setup. Fingerprinting rewards looking like everyone else.
The word you will be offered for all of this is anonymous. In the narrow sense that your name is not literally stapled to it, fine, but a profile that consistently lands on one real person does not need a name to decide which ads you see, which price you are quoted, or what a background-check company believes about you. SNITCH does one thing: it runs the same reads a tracker would run, and shows you the answers instead of sending them anywhere. Nothing here is uploaded, logged, or stored, and there is no analytics on the analytics. Think of it as the itemised receipt every other website quietly forgets to hand you.
The "1 in N" above is a rough ceiling from a few signals, weighted by hand, not a live count. For an actual measurement of how identifiable your browser is, run EFF's Cover Your Tracks.
You cannot switch fingerprinting off, but you can go from trivial to follow to genuinely expensive. That is the realistic goal, and it does not take much.
privacy.resistFingerprinting (or running the Arkenfox user.js) fakes a common screen size, timezone and canvas. Any one of these does more than the rest of this list combined.
media.peerconnection.enabled set to false in Firefox, or uBlock Origin's Prevent WebRTC from leaking local IP toggle). Deny location, camera, mic and notifications by default and grant them per-site when you actually mean to.